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Water Transfers Economic Efficiency
and Alternative Institutions
By
L. M. HARTMAN and DON SEASTONE
Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins Press. 1970
Pp. 127, $5.75
Hartman and Seastone explore in a useful way the water institu-
tions of the West and their effect on the economics of transfers of
water rights from one use to another, or from one place to another.
The book should be interesting to engineers engaged in water-rights
administration and the planning of water-use projects and to water
lawyers. Full appreciation may require at least the "short course" in
matrix analysis and input-output models and the economist's lex-
icon. This reviewer notes some deficiency in this respect.
The authors recognize that the basic objective of Western water
laws governing acquisition and transfer of water rights is to protect
property rights in water-including the rights of those party to the
transfer as well as the rights of others. They do not seem quite
prepared to accept the proposition that officials responsible for the
administration of water laws cannot properly influence economic
efficiency (maximization of national income) while acting on water-
right transfers.
When water is diverted from a stream and used for the irrigation of
land (or for most other purposes), a part of the water is consumed by
evaportation and transpiration and a part returns to the stream. In
common terminology, consumptive use equals diversion from the
stream minus return flow thereto. When return flow passes beyond
control of the water user and returns to the stream, it is again public
water, subject to appropriation by downstream users. A change of
point of diversion which returns the flow back in the stream at a
point below instead of above the diversion point of a downstream
appropriator dependent on the return flow, cannot be allowed with-
out conditions to protect the appropriator being leap-frogged, even
though the downstream appropriator has a junior right. Hartman and
Seastone use an example in which the flow available for diversion is
the controlling factor and a downstream appropriator dependent on
return flows is leap-frogged. They thus show how a person acquiring
a water right and transferring it downstream can have less water
available for his diversion than he had at the original point of
diversion. Appropriators downstream from the new point of
diversion would, of course, then have an increase in supply available
to them for diversion.
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The point of the example is that the accounting of return flows
required by existing water institutions may discourage water trans-
fers by increasing the cost to those wanting to acquire and transfer a
water right for a new use. Admittedly, the example given can occur
in real life and the problem might be cured, as suggested, by giving
the transferrer some control over his return flow. However, most
likely situations such as the example will not create a serious impedi-
ment to water-right transfers for two reasons.
First, as the authors recognize, most water transfers will be from
irrigation to municipal and industrial uses for which the demand is
relatively inelastic and much higher valued. In this case the effects of
the present procedures for accounting return flows will have only a
slight effect on allocation efficiency.
Second, the flow in the stream and the point of reentry of return
flow are not always controlling factors. It will likely be more
common, at least in "upstream" states such as New Mexico, that
downstream rights, including the rights of downstream states under
our compacts, can be protected by permit conditions framed to
avoid any increase in consumptive use as a result of the transfer. In
fact, in many cases it should be possible to permit the transferrer to
increase the amount of his diversion so long as the consumptive use is
not increased. This possibility is of importance where the nature of
the new use is such that the percentage of diverted water consumed
is less than the percentage consumed in the original use.
There are some minor misstatements in the discussion of New
Mexico water law which this reviewer points to with reluctance, in
case that they be traced to conferences with him. The book suggests
that the State Engineer may, at his discretion, set a hearing on a
protested water-right transfer application. He must, of course, con-
duct a hearing before acting on any protested application and should
undertake hydrographic surveys of river basins only as directed by
the court. In fact, the State Engineer was directed by the Legislature
(Section 75-4-2, NMSA, 1953 Comp.) in 1907 to undertake hydro-
graphic surveys of each stream system in the state, beginning with
those most used for irrigation, to obtain the data needed for adjudi-
cation of water rights and for other purposes.
The authors find the New Mexico system for transferring water
rights, which is managed by an administrative official (the State
Engineer) and which provides an opportunity for appeal to the
courts, more conducive to economically efficient decisions than the
Colorado system in which the court has original jurisdiction. Several
persuasive reasons are given for this finding. The New Mexico system
allows a relatively flexible, investigative procedure in lieu of the more
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rigid, adversary procedure of a court. The administrative procedure
tends to discount the difference in skill of attorneys and witnesses
retained by the parties to the advantage of water-right owners not
parties in the matter. Here again, it might be useful to recognize that
the economic efficiency of a water-right transfer is not a proper
concern of the deciding officer under either the New Mexico or the
Colorado system. However, this is not to say that amendments of the
law which would promote economic efficiency without jeopardizing
property rights should not be considered.
The authors use an "input-output model" to examine economic
interdependencies within a region and the cost and economic effi-
ciency of water transfers from one water use activity to another. This
technique should be useful in the formulation of water development
and management plans and in the determination of the cost of
achieving social objectives. It is demonstrated that this method could
be applied in determining the cost of growing municipal and indus-
trial demands of a region by comparing transfers from the usually
lower-valued irrigation uses with importation costs from regions of
surplus water supply.
The authors do not directly explore the economic interdepend-
ency of a region of deficient water supply and a region of surplus
water supply to determine whether economic and social benefits and
costs related to a major interregional water transfer might be advan-
tageous to both regions. Such transfers are, and apparently will be
for some time, a subject of interest at least in the western United
States and a sequel on this subject could be useful.
S. E. REYNOLDS*
*State Engineer of New Mexico.
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